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Animals–Property or Persons?
Gary L. Francione

Abstract

When it comes to our moral and legal obligations to nonhuman animals, we suffer
from “moral schizophrenia.” We claim to recognize that animals have morally
significant interests in not suffering and that it is morally wrong to inflict “unnecessary” suffering on animals. Although we have laws that purport to reflect these
moral sentiments, the overwhelming portion of the pain, suffering, and death that
we impose on animals cannot be regarded as necessary in any sense. Our moral
schizophrenia is related to the status of animals as property, which means that, as
a practical matter, animal suffering will be regarded as necessary whenever it benefits human property owners. If we really are to take animal interests seriously,
we can no longer treat animals as human resources. This does not mean that we
must give animals the rights that we accord to humans, or that we cannot choose
human interests over animal interests in situations of genuine conflict. Rather, we
must recognize that animals have one right–the right not to be treated as property,
and we cannot create conflicts between human and animals by using animals in
ways in which we would never use any humans. As long as animals are human
property, the principle of equal consideration can never apply to them (just as it
could not apply to slaves), and animals will necessarily remain as nothing more
than things that possess no morally significant interests. The theory presented
applies to any animal that is sentient and does not require that animals have any
additional cognitive characteristics.
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Animals—Property or Persons?
Gary L. Francione
When it comes to other animals, we humans exhibit what can best be described as
moral schizophrenia. Although we claim to take animals seriously and to regard
them as having morally significant interests, we routinely ignore those interests
whenever it benefits us. In this essay, I argue that our moral schizophrenia is
related to the status of animals as property, which means that animals are nothing
more than things despite the many laws that supposedly protect them. If we are
going to make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, then we have
no choice but to accord animals one right: the right not to be treated as our
property.
Our acceptance that animals have this one right would require that we
abolish and not merely better regulate our institutionalized exploitation of
animals. Although this is an ostensibly radical conclusion, it necessarily follows
from certain moral notions that we have professed to accept for the better part of
200 years. Moreover, recognition of this right would not preclude our choosing
humans over animals in situations of genuine conflict.
Animals: Our Moral Schizophrenia
There is a profound disparity between what we say we believe about animals, and
how we actually treat them. On one hand, we claim to take animals seriously.
Two-thirds of Americans polled by the Associated Press agree with the following
statement: “An animal=s right to live free of suffering should be just as important
as a person=s right to live free of suffering,” and more than 50 percent of
Americans believe that it is wrong to kill animals to make fur coats or to hunt
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them for sport.1 Almost 50 percent regard animals to be “just like humans in all
important ways.”2 These attitudes are reflected in other nations as well. For
example, 94 percent of Britons3 and 88 percent of Spaniards4 think that animals
should be protected from acts of cruelty, and only 14 percent of Europeans
support the use of genetic engineering that results in animal suffering, even if the
purpose is to create drugs that would save human lives.5
On the other hand, our actual treatment of animals stands in stark contrast
to our proclamations about our regard for their moral status.6 Consider the
suffering of animals at our hands. In the United States alone, according to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, we kill more than 8 billion animals a year for food;
every day, we slaughter approximately 23 million animals, or more than 950,000
per hour, or almost 16,000 per minute, or more than 260 every second. This is to
say nothing of the billions more killed worldwide. These animals are raised under
horrendous intensive conditions known as “factory farming,” mutilated in various
ways without pain relief, transported long distances in cramped, filthy containers,
and finally slaughtered amid the stench, noise, and squalor of the abattoir. We kill
billions of fish and other sea animals annually. We catch them with hooks and
allow them to suffocate in nets. We buy lobsters at the supermarket, where they
are kept for weeks in crowded tanks with their claws closed by rubber bands and
without receiving any food, and we cook them alive in boiling water.
Wild animals fare no better. We hunt and kill approximately 200 million
animals in the United States annually, not including animals killed on commercial

1. David Foster, “Animal Rights Activists Getting Message Across: New Poll Findings
Show Americans More in Tune with ‘Radical’ Views,” Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 1996, at C8.
2. John Balzer, “Creatures Great andCEqual,” L.A. Times, Dec. 25, 1993, at A1.
3. Julie Kirkbride, “Peers Use Delays to Foil Hedgehog Cruelty Measure,” Daily
Telegraph, Nov. 3, 1995, at 12.
4. Edward Gorman, “Woman=s Goring Fails to Halt Death in the Afternoon,” Times
(London), June 30, 1995, Home News Section.
5. Malcolm Eames, “Four Legs Very Good,” Guardian, Aug. 25, 1995, at 17.
6. For sources discussing the numbers of animals used for various purposes, see Gary L.
Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, at xxBxxi (2000).
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game ranches or at events such as pigeon shoots. Moreover, hunters often cripple
animals without killing or retrieving them. It is estimated, for example, that bow
hunters do not retrieve 50 percent of the animals hit with their arrows. This
increases the true death toll from hunting by at least tens of millions of uncounted
animals. Wounded animals often die slowly, over a period of hours or even days,
from blood loss, punctured intestines and stomachs, and severe infections.
In the United States alone, we use millions of animals annually for
biomedical experiments, product testing, and education. Animals are used to
measure the effects of toxins, diseases, drugs, radiation, bullets, and all forms of
physical and psychological deprivations. We burn, poison, irradiate, blind, starve,
and electrocute them. They are purposely riddled with diseases such as cancer and
infections such as pneumonia. We deprive them of sleep, keep them in solitary
confinement, remove their limbs and eyes, addict them to drugs, force them to
withdraw from drug addiction, and cage them for the duration of their lives. If
they do not die during experimental procedures, we almost always kill them
immediately afterward, or we recycle them for other experiments or tests and then
kill them.
We use millions of animals for the sole purpose of providing
entertainment. Animals are used in film and television. There are thousands of
zoos, circuses, carnivals, race tracks, dolphin exhibits, and rodeos in the United
States, and these and similar activities, such as bullfighting, also take place in
other countries. Animals used in entertainment are often forced to endure lifelong
incarceration and confinement, poor living conditions, extreme physical danger
and hardship, and brutal treatment. Most animals used for entertainment purposes
are killed when no longer useful, or sold into research or as targets for shooting on
commercial hunting preserves.
And we kill millions of animals annually simply for fashion.
Approximately 40 million animals worldwide are trapped, snared, or raised in
intensive confinement on fur farms, where they are electrocuted or gassed or have
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their necks broken. In the United States, 8B10 million animals are killed every
year for fur.
For all of these reasons, we may be said to suffer from a sort of moral
schizophrenia when it comes to our thinking about animals. We claim to regard
animals as having morally significant interests, but our behavior is to the contrary.
Animals as Things
Before the nineteenth century, the foregoing litany of animal uses would not have
raised any concern. Western culture did not recognize that humans had any moral
obligations to animals because animals did not matter morally at all. We could
have moral obligations that concerned animals, but these obligations were really
owed to other humans and not to animals. Animals were regarded as things, as
having a moral status no different from that of inanimate objects.
As late as the seventeenth century, the view was advanced that animals are
nothing more than machines. René Descartes (1596B1650), considered the
founder of modern philosophy, argued that animals are not consciousCthey have
no mind whatsoeverCbecause they do not possess a soul, which God invested
only in humans. In support of the idea that animals lack consciousness, Descartes
maintained that they do not use verbal or sign languageCsomething that every
human being does but that no animal does. Descartes certainly recognized that
animals act in what appear to be purposive and intelligent ways and that they
seem to be conscious, but he claimed that they are really no different from
machines made by God. Indeed, he likened animals to “automatons, or moving
machines.”7 Moreover, just as a clock can tell time better than humans can, so
some animal machines can perform some tasks better than humans can.

7. René Descartes, “Discourse on the Method,” pt. V, in 1 The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes 111, 139 (John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, & Dugald Murdoch trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1985) (1637). Some scholars have argued that Descartes did recognize animal
consciousness in certain respects, and that traditional interpretations of Descartes are incorrect.
See, e.g., Daisie Radnor & Michael Radnor, Animal Consciousness (1989). There is, however, no
doubt that Descartes regarded animals as morally indistinguishable from inanimate objects and, to
the extent that he viewed animals as conscious and as having interests in not suffering, he ignored
those interests.
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An obvious implication of Descartes=s position was that animals are not
sentient; they are not conscious of pain, pleasure, or anything else. Descartes and
his followers performed experiments in which they nailed animals by their paws
to boards and cut them open to reveal their beating hearts. They burned, scalded,
and mutilated animals in every conceivable manner. When the animals reacted as
though they were suffering pain, Descartes dismissed the reaction as no different
from the sound of a machine that is functioning improperly. A crying dog,
Descartes maintained, is no different from a whining gear that needs oil.
In Descartes=s view, it is as senseless to talk about our moral obligations to
animals, machines created by God, as it is to talk about our moral obligations to
clocks, machines created by humans. We can have moral obligations that concern
the clock, but any such obligations are really owed to other humans and not to the
clock. If I smash the clock with a hammer, you may object because the clock
belongs to you, or because I injure you when a piece of the clock accidentally
strikes you, or because it is wasteful to destroy a perfectly good clock that could
be used by someone else. I may be similarly obliged not to damage your dog, but
the obligation is owed to you, not to the dog. The dog, like the clock, according to
Descartes, is nothing more than a machine and possesses no interests in the first
place.
There were others who did not share Descartes=s view that animals are
merely machines but who still denied that we can have any moral obligations to
animals. For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724B1804)
recognized that animals are sentient and can suffer, but denied that we can have
any direct moral obligations to them because, according to Kant, they are neither
rational nor self-aware. According to Kant, animals are merely a means to human
ends; they are “man=s instruments.” They exist only for our use and have no value
in themselves. To the extent that our treatment of animals matters at all for Kant,
it does so only because of its impact on other humans: “[H]e who is cruel to
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animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.”8 Kant argued that if we
shoot and kill a faithful and obedient dog because the dog has grown old and is no
longer capable of serving us, our act violates no obligation that we owe to the
dog. The act is wrong only because of our moral obligation to reward the faithful
service of other humans; killing the dog tends to make us less inclined to fulfill
these human obligations. “[S]o far as animals are concerned, we have no direct
duties.” Animals exist “merely as a means to an end. That end is man.”9
The view that we have no direct moral obligations to animals was also
reflected in Anglo-American law. Before the nineteenth century, it is difficult to
find any statutory recognition of legal obligations owed directly to animals.10 To
the extent that the law provided animals any protection, it was, for the most part,
couched solely in terms of human concerns, primarily property interests. If Simon
injured Jane=s cow, Simon=s act might violate a malicious mischief statute if it
could be proved that the act manifested malice toward Jane. If Simon had malice
toward the cow but not toward Jane, then he could not be prosecuted. It was
irrelevant whether Simon=s malice was directed toward Jane=s cow or toward her
inanimate property. Any judicial condemnation of animal cruelty was, with rare
exceptions, expressed only as concern that such conduct would translate into
cruelty to other humans, or that acts of cruelty to animals might offend public
decency and cause a breach of the peace. That is, the law reflected the notion
expressed by Kant and others that if there were any reason for us to be kind to
animals, it had nothing to do with any obligation that we owed to animals, but
only with our obligations to other humans.
8. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics 240 (Louis Infield trans., Harper Torchbooks,
1963).
9. Id. at 239. There were others, such as Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and John Locke,
who recognized that animals are sentient but who claimed that they lack characteristics such as
rationality or abstract thought, and we could, therefore, treat them as things. See Francione, supra
note 6, at 103B29. See also notes 74B97 and accompanying text.
10. A possible exception is the 1641 legal code of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which
prohibited cruelty to domestic animals. See Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law
121 (1995). It is not clear whether this provision prohibited cruelty at least in part out of concern
for the animals themselves, or only because cruelty to animals might adversely affect humans.
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The Humane Treatment Principle: A Rejection of Animals as Things
Consider the following example. Simon proposes to torture a dog by burning the
dog with a blowtorch. Simon=s only reason for torturing the dog is that he derives
pleasure from this sort of activity. Does Simon=s proposal raise any moral
concern? Is Simon violating some moral obligation not to use the animal in this
way for his amusement? Or is Simon=s action morally no different from crushing
and eating a walnut?
I think that most of us would not hesitate to maintain that blowtorching the
dog simply for pleasure is not a morally justifiable act under any circumstances.
What is the basis of our moral judgment? Is it merely that we are concerned about
the effect of Simon=s action on other humans? Do we object to the torture of the
dog merely because it might upset other humans who like dogs? Do we object
because by torturing the dog Simon may become a more callous or unkind person
in his dealings with other humans? We may very well rest our moral objection to
Simon=s action in part on our concern for the effect of his action on other humans,
but that is not our primary reason for objecting. After all, we would condemn the
act even if Simon tortures the animal in secret, or even if, apart from his appetite
for torturing dogs, Simon is a charming fellow who shows only kindness to other
humans.
Suppose that the dog is the companion animal of Simon=s neighbor, Jane.
Do we object to the torture because the dog is Jane=s property? We may very well
object to Simon=s action because the dog belongs to Jane, but again, that is not our
first concern. We would find Simon=s action objectionable even if the dog were a
stray.
The primary reason that we find Simon=s action morally objectionable is
its direct effect on the dog. The dog is sentient; like us, the dog is the sort of being
who has the capacity to suffer and has an interest in not being blowtorched.11 The
11. The neurological and physiological similarities between humans and nonhumans
render the fact of animal sentience noncontroversial. Even mainstream science accepts that
animals are sentient. For example, the U.S. Public Health Service states that “[u]nless the contrary
is established, investigators should consider that procedures that cause pain or distress in human
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dog prefers, or wants, or desires not to be blowtorched. We have an
obligationCone owed directly to the dog and not merely one that concerns the
dogCnot to torture the dog. The sole ground for this obligation is that the dog is
sentient; no other characteristic, such as humanlike rationality, reflective selfconsciousness, or the ability to communicate in a human language, is necessary.
We regard it as morally necessary to justify our infliction of harm on the dog
simply because the dog can experience pain and suffering, We may disagree
about whether a particular justification suffices, but we all agree that some
justification is required, and Simon=s pleasure cannot constitute such a
justification. An integral part of our moral thinking is the idea that, other things
being equal, the fact that an action causes pain counts as a reason against that
action, not merely because imposing harm on another sentient being somehow
diminishes us, but because imposing harm on another sentient being is wrong in
itself. And it does not matter whether Simon proposes to blowtorch for pleasure
the dog or another animal, such as a cow. We would object to his conduct in
either case.
In short, most of us claim to reject the characterization of animals as
things that has dominated Western thinking for many centuries. For the better part
of 200 years, Anglo-American moral and legal culture has made a distinction
between sentient creatures and inanimate objects. Although we believe that we
ought to prefer humans over animals when interests conflict, most of us accept as
completely uncontroversial that our use and treatment of animals are guided by
what we might call the humane treatment principle, or the view that because
animals can suffer, we have a moral obligation that we owe directly to animals
not to impose unnecessary suffering on them.
The humane treatment principle finds its origins in the theories of English
lawyer and utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748B1832). Bentham
beings may cause pain or distress in other animals.” U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, National Institutes of Health, “Public Health Service Policy and Government Principles
Regarding the Care and Use of Animals,” in Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources, Guide for
the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals 117 (1996).
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argued that despite any differences, humans and animals are similar in that they
both can suffer, and it is only the capacity to suffer and not the capacity for
speech or reason or anything else that is required for animals to matter morally
and to have legal protection. Bentham maintained that animals had been
“degraded into the class of things,” with the result that their interest in not
suffering had been ignored.12 In a statement as profound as it was simple,
Bentham illuminated the irrelevance of characteristics other than sentience: “[A]
full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can theytalk ? but, Can they suffer?”13
Bentham=s position marked a sharp departure from a cultural tradition that
had never before regarded animals as other than things devoid of morally
significant interests. He rejected the views of those, like Descartes, who
maintained that animals are not sentient and have no interests. He also rejected the
views of those, like Kant, who maintained that animals have interests but that
those interests are not morally significant because animals lack characteristics
other than sentience, and that our treatment of animals matters only to the extent
that it affects our treatment of other humans. For Bentham, our treatment of
animals matters because of its effect on beings that can suffer, and our duties are
owed directly to them. Bentham urged the enactment of laws to protect animals
from suffering.

12. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch.
XVII, para. 4, at 282 (footnote omitted) (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970)
(1781). I do not mean to suggest that Bentham was the first person ever to express a concern about
animal suffering distinct from its effect on human character, nor that he was the only or the first to
argue that humans and animals have morally significant interests in not suffering. Several years
before Bentham, Rev. Humphry Primatt expressed the view that suffering was an evil irrespective
of species. See Humphry Primatt, A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute
Animals (London, T. Cadell 1776). Bentham clearly had a greater impact on both moral and legal
thinking concerning the issue.
13. Bentham, supra note 12, at 282B83 n.b.
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Bentham=s views had a profound effect on various legal reformers, and the
result was that the legal systems of the United States and Britain (as well as other
nations) purported to incorporate the humane treatment principle in animal
welfare laws. These laws are of two kinds: general and specific. General animal
welfare laws, such as anticruelty laws, prohibit cruelty or the infliction of
unnecessary suffering on animals without distinguishing between various uses of
animals. For example, New York law imposes a criminal sanction on any person
who “overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures,
maims, mutilates or kills any animal.”14 Delaware law prohibits cruelty and
defines as cruel “every act or omission to act whereby unnecessary or
unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted,” and includes
“mistreatment of any animal or neglect of any animal under the care and control
of the neglector, whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering
is caused.”15 In Britain, the Protection of Animals Act of 1911 makes it a criminal
offense to “cruelly beat, kick, ill-treat, over-ride, over-drive, over-load, torture,
infuriate, or terrify any animal” or to impose Aunnecessary suffering” on
animals.16 Specific animal welfare laws purport to apply the humane treatment
principle to a particular animal use. For example, the American Animal Welfare
Act, enacted in 1966 and amended on numerous occasions,17 the British Cruelty
to Animals Act, enacted in 1876,18 and the British Animals (Scientific
Procedures) Act of 198619 concern the treatment of animals used in experiments.

14. N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law ' 353 (Consol. 2002). The first known anticruelty statute in
the United States was passed in Maine in 1821. New York passed a statute in 1829, but New York
courts held as early as 1822 that cruelty was an offense at common law.
15. Del. Code. Ann., tit. 11, '' 1325(a)(1) & (4) (2002).
16. Protection of Animals Act, 1911, ch. 27 ' 1(1)(a) (Eng.). British legislation
prohibiting cruelty to animals was passed as early as 1822.
17. 7 U.S.C. '' 2131B2159 (2003).
18. Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876 (Eng.).
19. Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act, 1986 (Eng.).
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The American Humane Slaughter Act, originally enacted in 1958, regulates the
killing of animals used for food.20
As we saw earlier, if Simon injured Jane=s cow, malicious mischief
statutes required a showing that Simon bore malice toward Jane. To the extent
that courts had any concern about cruelty to animals, this concern was limited to
the effect that cruelty might have on public sensibilities or on the tendency of
cruelty to animals to encourage cruelty to other humans. The passage of
anticruelty laws allowed for Simon=s prosecution even if he bore Jane no ill will
and instead intended malice only to her cow. Moreover, these laws reflect concern
about the moral significance of animal suffering, in addition to the detrimental
repercussions of cruelty to animals for humans. Anticruelty laws are often explicit
in applying to all animals, whether owned or unowned. Thus, whereas malicious
mischief statutes were “intended to protect the beasts as property instead of as
creatures susceptible of suffering,” anticruelty statutes are “designed for the
protection of animals.”21 They are intended “for the benefit of animals, as
creatures capable of feeling and suffering, and [are] intended to protect them from
cruelty, without reference to their being property.”22 The purpose of these laws is,
in part, to instill in humans “a humane regard for the rights and feelings of the
brute creation by reproving the evil and indifferent tendencies in human nature in
its intercourse with animals.”23 They are said to “recognize and attempt to protect
some abstract rights in all that animate creation, made subject to man by the
creation, from the largest and noblest to the smallest and most insignificant.”24
Anticruelty laws acknowledge that because animals are sentient, we have legal
obligations that we owe directly to animals to refrain from imposing unnecessary
pain and suffering on them: “Pain is an evil,” and “[i]t is impossible for a right

20. 7 U.S.C. '' 1901B1907 (2003).
21. State v. Prater, 109 S.W. 1047, 1049 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908).
22. Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 331 (1887).
23. Hunt v. State, 29 N.E. 933, 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1892).
24. Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 458 (1881).
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minded man . . . to say that unjustifiable cruelty [to animals] is not a wrong.”25
Other animal welfare laws similarly focus on the suffering of animals as
intrinsically undesirable.26
Many animal welfare laws, such as anticruelty statutes, are criminal laws.
For the most part, only those moral rules that are widely accepted, such as
prohibitions against killing other humans, inflicting physical harm on them, or
taking or destroying their property, are enshrined in criminal laws. That many
animal welfare laws are criminal laws suggests that we take animal interests
seriously enough to punish violations of the humane treatment principle with the
social stigma of a criminal penalty.
The humane treatment principle and the operation of the animal welfare
laws that reflect it purport to require that we balance the interests of animals
against our interests as humans in order to determine whether animal suffering is
necessary. To balance interests means to assess the relative strengths of
conflicting interests. If our suffering in not using animals outweighs the animal
interest in not suffering, then our interests prevail, and the animal suffering is
regarded as necessary. If no justifiable human interests are at stake, then the
infliction of suffering on animals must be regarded as unnecessary. For example,
the British law regulating the use of animals in experiments requires, before any
experiment is approved, a balancing of “the likely adverse effects on the animals
concerned against the benefit likely to accrue.”27
In sum, the principle assumes that we may use animals when it is
necessary to do soCwhen we are faced with a conflict between animal and human
interestsCand that we should impose only the minimum amount of pain and
suffering necessary to achieve our purpose. If a prohibition against unnecessary
suffering of animals is to have any meaningful content, it must preclude the

25. People v. Brunell, 48 How. Pr. 435, 437 (N.Y. City Ct. 1874).
26. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 10, at 193 (discussing the federal Animal Welfare
Act).
27. Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act, 1986, ch. 14, ' 5(4) (Eng.).
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infliction of suffering on animals merely for our pleasure, amusement, or
convenience. If there is a feasible alternative to our use of animals in a particular
situation, then the principle would seem to proscribe such use.
The Problem: Unnecessary Suffering
Although we express disapproval of the unnecessary suffering of animals, nearly
all of our animal use can be justified only by habit, convention, amusement,
convenience, or pleasure.28 To put the matter another way, most of the suffering
that we impose on animals is completely unnecessary, and we are not
substantially different from Simon, who proposes to blowtorch the dog for
pleasure. For example, the uses of animals for sport hunting and entertainment
purposes cannot, by definition, be considered necessary. Nevertheless, these
activities are protected by laws that supposedly prohibit the infliction of
unnecessary suffering on animals. It is certainly not necessary for us to wear fur
coats, or to use animals to test duplicative household products, or to have yet
another brand of lipstick or aftershave lotion.
More important in terms of numbers of animals used, however, is the
animal agriculture industry, in which billions of animals are killed for food
annually. It is not necessary in any sense to eat meat or animal products; indeed,
an increasing number of health care professionals maintain that these foods may
be detrimental to human health. Moreover, respected environmental scientists
have pointed out the tremendous inefficiencies and resulting costs to our planet of
animal agriculture. For example, animals consume more protein than they
produce. For every kilogram (2.2 pounds) of animal protein produced, animals
consume an average of almost 6 kilograms, or more than 13 pounds, of plant
protein from grains and forage. It takes more than 100,000 liters of water to
produce one kilogram of beef, and approximately 900 liters to produce one
kilogram of wheat. In any event, our only justification for the pain, suffering, and
28. For a discussion about the necessity of various animal uses, see Francione, supra note
6, at 9B49. See also Stephen R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (1977) (arguing that much
animal use cannot be regarded as necessary).
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death inflicted on these billions of farm animals is that we enjoy the taste of their
flesh.
Although many regard the use of animals in experiments as involving a
genuine conflict of human and animal interests, the necessity of animal use for
this purpose is open to serious question as well. Considerable empirical evidence
challenges the notion that animal experiments are necessary to ensure human
health and indicates that, in many instances, reliance on animal models has
actually been counterproductive.
Animals as Property: An Unbalanced Balance
The profound inconsistency between what we say about animals and how we
actually treat them is related to the status of animals as our property.29 Animals
are commodities that we own and that have no value other than that which we, as
property owners, choose to give them. Although Bentham changed moral thinking
and legal doctrine by introducing the idea that sentience is the only characteristic
required for animals to matter, neither he nor the reformers interested in
incorporating his views into law ever questioned the property status of animals.30
Under the law, “animals are owned in the same way as inanimate objects such as
cars and furniture.”31 They “are by law treated as any other form of movable
property and may be the subject of absolute, i.e., complete ownership . . . [and]
the owner has at his command all the protection that the law provides in respect of
absolute ownership.”32 The owner is entitled to exclusive physical possession of
29. See generally Francione, supra note 10 (discussing the status of animals as property
as a general matter, and in the context of anticruelty laws and the federal Animal Welfare Act).
The status of animals as property has existed for thousands of years. Indeed, historical evidence
indicates that the domestication of animals is closely related to the development of the concepts of
property and money. The property status of animals is particularly important in Western culture
for two reasons. First, property rights are accorded a special status and are considered to be among
the most important rights we have. Second, the modern Western concept of property, whereby
resources are regarded as separate objects that are assigned and belong to particular individuals
who are allowed to use the property to the exclusion of everyone else, has its origin in God=s grant
to humans of dominion over animals. See id. at 24B49; Francione, supra note 6, at 50B54.
30. See infra notes 75B81 and accompanying text.
31. Godfrey Sandys-Winsch, Animal Law 1 (1978).
32. T.G. Field-Fisher, Animals and the Law 19 (1964).
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the animal, the use of the animal for economic and other gain, and the right to
make contracts with respect to the animal or to use the animal as collateral for a
loan. The owner is under a duty to ensure that her animal property does not harm
other humans or their property, but she can sell or bequeath the animal, give the
animal away, or have the animal taken from her as part of the execution of a legal
judgment against her. She can also kill the animal. Wild animals are generally
regarded as owned by the state and held in trust for the benefit of the people, but
they can be made the property of particular humans through hunting or by taming
and confining them.
The property status of animals renders meaningless any balancing that is
supposedly required under the humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws,
because what we really balance are the interests of property owners against the
interests of their animal property. It is, of course, absurd to suggest that we can
balance human interests, which are protected by claims of right in general and of
a right to own property in particular, against the interests of property, which exists
only as a means to the ends of humans. Although we claim to recognize that we
may prefer animal interests over human interests only when there is a conflict of
interests, there is always a conflict between the interests of property owners who
want to use their property and the interests of their animal property. The human
property interest will almost always prevail. The animal in question is always a
“pet” or a “laboratory animal,” or a “game animal,” or a “food animal,” or a
“rodeo animal,” or some other form of animal property that exists solely for our
use and has no value except that which we give it. There is really no choice to be
made between the human and the animal interest because the choice has already
been predetermined by the property status of the animal; the “suffering” of
property owners who cannot use their property as they wish counts more than
animal suffering. We are allowed to impose any suffering required to use our
animal property for a particular purpose even if that purpose is our mere
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amusement or pleasure. As long as we use our animal property to generate an
economic benefit, there is no effective limit on our use or treatment of animals.33
There are several specific ways in which animal welfare laws ensure that
there will never be a meaningful balance of human and animal interests. First,
many of these laws explicitly exempt most forms of institutionalized property use,
which account for the largest number of animals that we use. The most frequent
exemptions from state anticruelty statutes involve scientific experiments,
agricultural practices, and hunting.34 The Animal Welfare Act, the primary federal
law that regulates the use of animals in biomedical experiments, does not even
apply to most of the animals used in experimentsCrats and miceCand imposes no
meaningful limits on the amount of pain and suffering that may be inflicted on
animals in the conduct of experiments.35
Second, even if anticruelty statutes do not do so explicitly, courts have
effectively exempted our common uses of animals from scrutiny by interpreting
these statutes as not prohibiting the infliction of even extreme suffering if it is
incidental to an accepted use of animals and a customary practice on the part of
animal owners.36 An act “which inflicts pain, even the great pain of mutilation,
and which is cruel in the ordinary sense of the word” is not prohibited
“[w]henever the purpose for which the act is done is to make the animal more
serviceable for the use of man.”37 For example, courts have held consistently that
animals used for food may be mutilated in ways that unquestionably cause severe
pain and suffering and that would normally be regarded as cruel or even as
torture. These practices are permitted, however, because animal agriculture is an
accepted institutionalized animal use, and those in the meat industry regard the

33. To the extent that animal uses, such as certain types of animal fighting, have been
prohibited, this may be understood more in terms of class hierarchy and cultural prejudice than in
terms of moral concern about animals. See Francione, supra note 10, at 18.
34. See id. at 139B42.
35. See id. at 224. For a discussion of the Animal Welfare Act, see id. at 185B249.
36. See id. at 142B56; Francione, supra note 6, at 58B63.
37. Murphy v. Manning, 2 Ex. D. 307, 313, 314 (1877) (Cleasby, B.).
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practices as normal and necessary to facilitate that use. Courts often presume that
animal owners will act in their best economic interests and will not intentionally
inflict more suffering than is necessary on an animal because to do so would
diminish the monetary value of the animal.38 For example, in Callaghan v. Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the court held that the painful act of
dehorning cattle did not constitute unnecessary abuse because farmers would not
perform this procedure if it were not necessary. The self-interest of the farmer
would prevent the infliction of “useless pain or torture,” which “would necessarily
reduce the condition of the animal; and, unless they very soon recovered, the
farmer would lose in the sale.”39
Third, anticruelty laws are generally criminal laws and the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant engaged in an unlawful act with
a culpable state of mind. The problem is that if a defendant is inflicting pain or
suffering on an animal as part of an accepted institutionalized use of animals, it is
difficult to prove that she acted with the requisite mental state to justify criminal
liability.40 For example, in Regalado v. United States,41 Regalado was convicted
of violating the anticruelty statute of the District of Columbia for beating a puppy.
Regalado appealed, claiming that he did not intend to harm the puppy and
inflicted the beating only for disciplinary purposes. The court held that anticruelty
statutes were “not intended to place unreasonable restrictions on the infliction of
such pain as may be necessary for the training or discipline of an animal” and that
38. See Francione, supra note 10, at 127B28; Francione, supra note 6, at 66B67. This
presumption not only insulates customary practices from being found to violate anticruelty laws,
but also militates against finding the necessary criminal intent in cases involving noncustomary
uses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barr, 44 Pa. C. 284 (Lancaster County Ct. 1916). See infra notes
40B43 and accompanying text.
39. 16 L.R.Ir. 325, 335 (C.P.D. 1885) (Murphy, J.). In Britain, the dehorning of older
cattle was found to violate the anticruelty statute but only because dehorning had been
discontinued and was no longer an accepted agriculture practice. See Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q.B. 203
(1889). In his opinion, Hawkins, J., noted that the fact that the practice had been abandoned by
farmers who were acting in their economic self-interest was proof that the practice was
unnecessary. See id. at 221B22.
40. See Francione, supra note 10, at 135B39; Francione, supra note 6, at 63B66.
41. 572 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1990).
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the statute only prohibited acts done with malice or a cruel disposition.42
Although the court affirmed Regalado=s conviction, it recognized that “proof of
malice will usually be circumstantial, and the line between discipline and cruelty
will often be difficult to draw.”43
Fourth, many animal welfare laws have wholly inadequate penalty
provisions, and we are reluctant, in any event, to impose the stigma of criminal
liability on animal owners for what they do with their property.44 Moreover, those
without an ownership interest generally do not have standing to bring legal
challenges to the use or treatment of animals by their owners.45
As the foregoing makes clear, because animals are property, we do not
balance interests to determine whether it is necessary to use animals at all for
particular purposes. We simply assume that it is appropriate to use animals for
food, recreation, entertainment, clothing, or experimentsCthe primary ways in
which we use animals as commodities to generate social wealth and most of
which cannot be described plausibly as involving any genuine conflict of human
and animal interests. Animal welfare laws do not even apply to many of these
uses. To the extent that we do ask whether the imposition of pain and suffering is
necessary, the inquiry is limited to whether particular treatment is in compliance
with the customs and practices of property owners who, we assume, will not
inflict more pain and suffering on their animal property than is required for the
purpose. The only way to characterize this process is as a “balancing” of the
property owner=s interest in using animal property against the interest of an
animal in not being used in ways that fail to comply with those customs and
practices. Although animal welfare laws are intended to protect the interests of

42. Id. at 420.
43. Id. at 421.
44. See Francione, supra note 10, at 156; Francione, supra note 6, at 67B68. In recent
years, many states have amended their anticruelty laws and have increased penalties for at least
certain violations. It remains to be seen whether this will make any real difference because most
animal uses will remain exempt and there will still be problems with proof of criminal intent.
45. See Francione, supra note 10, at 65B90, 156B58; Francione, supra note 6, at 69B70.
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animals without reference to their being property, animal interests are protected
only insofar as they serve the goal of rational property use.46
Our infliction of suffering on animals raises a legal question only when it
does not conform to the customs and practices of those institutionsCwhen we
intentionally inflict suffering in ways that do not maximize social wealth, or when
the only explanation for the behavior can be characterized as “the gratification of
a malignant or vindictive temper.”47 For example, in State v. Tweedie,48 the
defendant was found to have violated the anticruelty law by killing a cat in a
microwave oven. In re William G.49 upheld a cruelty conviction where a minor
kicked a dog and set her on fire because she would not mate with his dog. In
Motes v. State,50 the defendant was found guilty of violating the anticruelty statute
when he set fire to a dog merely because the dog was barking. In Tuck v. United
States,51 a pet shop owner was convicted of cruelty when he placed animals in an
unventilated display window and refused to remove a rabbit whose body
temperature registered as high as the thermometer was calibratedC110 degrees
Fahrenheit. In People v. Voelker,52 the court held that cutting off the heads of
three live, conscious iguanas “without justification” could constitute a violation of
the anticruelty law. In LaRue v. State,53 a cruelty conviction was upheld because
the defendant collected a large number of stray dogs and failed to provide them
with veterinary care; the dogs suffered from mange, blindness, dehydration,
pneumonia, and distemper and had to be killed. In State v. Schott,54 Schott was
46. See Francione, supra note 10, at 27B32.
47. Commonwealth v. Lufkin, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 579, 581 (1863). See Francione, supra
note 10, at 137B38, 153B56; Francione, supra note 6, at 70B73.
48. 444 A.2d 855 (R.I. 1982).
49. 447 A.2d 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
50. 375 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
51. 477 A.2d 1115 (D.C. 1984).
52. 172 Misc.2d 564 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1997).
53. 478 S.2d 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
54. 384 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 1986).
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convicted of cruelty to animals when police found dozens of cows and pigs dead
or dying from malnutrition and dehydration on his farm. Schott=s defense was that
bad weather prevented him from caring for his livestock. The jury found Schott
guilty of cruelty and neglect, and the appellate court affirmed. These are,
however, unusual cases and constitute a minuscule fraction of the instances in
which we inflict suffering on animals.
Moreover, the very same act may be either protected or prohibited
depending only on whether it is part of an accepted institution of animal
exploitation. If someone kills a cat in a microwave, sets a dog on fire, allows the
body temperature of a rabbit to rise to the point of heat stroke, severs the heads of
conscious animals, or allows animals to suffer untreated serious illnesses, the
conduct may violate the anticruelty laws. But if a researcher engages in the exact
same conduct as part of an experiment (and a number of researchers have killed
animals or inflicted pain on them in the same and similar ways) the conduct is
protected by the law because the researcher is supposedly using the animal to
generate a benefit. A farmer may run afoul of the anticruelty law if she neglects
her animals and allows them to suffer from malnutrition or dehydration for no
reason, but she may mutilate her animals and raise them in conditions of severe
confinement and deprivation, if she intends to sell them for food. The permitted
actions cause as much if not more distress to animals as does neglecting them, but
they are considered part of normal animal husbandry and are, therefore, protected
under the law.
Thus, because animals are our property, the law will require their interests
to be observed only to the extent that it facilitates their exploitation. This
observation holds true even in countries where there is arguably a greater moral
concern about animals. Britain, for instance, has more restrictions on animal use
than does the United States, but the differences in permitted animal treatment are
more formal than substantive. In discussing British animal welfare laws, one
commentator has noted that Amuch of the animal welfare agenda has been
obstructed and it is difficult to think of legislation improving the welfare of
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animals that has seriously damaged the interests of the animal users.”55 The law
may in theory impose regulations that go beyond the minimum level of care
required to exploit animals, yet it has rarely done so, for there are significant
economic and other obstacles involved.56 Voluntary changes in industry standards
of animal welfare generally occur only when animal users regard these changes as
cost-effective.57
The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we
reject the status of animals as things. We treat animals as the moral equivalent of
inanimate objects with no morally significant interests. We bring billions of
animals into existence annually simply for the purpose of killing them. Animals
have market prices. Dogs and cats are sold in pet stores like compact discs;
financial markets trade in futures for pork bellies and cattle. Any interest that an
animal has represents an economic cost that may be ignored to maximize overall
social wealth and has no intrinsic value in our assessments. That is what it means
to be property.

55. Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality 234 (1993).
56. See Francione, supra note 6, at 13, 73B76, 181B82. See generally Gary L. Francione,
Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (1996) [hereinafter,
Francione, Rain Without Thunder] (discussing unsuccessful efforts by the animal protection
movement to obtain animal welfare laws that exceed the minimal standards required to exploit
animals).
57. For example, McDonald=s, the fast-food chain, announced that it would require its
suppliers to observe standards of animal welfare that went beyond current standards: “Animal
welfare is also an important part of quality assurance. For high-quality food products at the
counter, you need high quality coming from the farm. Animals that are well cared for are less
prone to illness, injury, and stress, which all have the same negative impact on the condition of
livestock as they do on people. Proper animal welfare practices also benefit producers. Complying
with our animal welfare guidelines helps ensure efficient production and reduces waste and loss.
This enables our suppliers to be highly competitive.” Bruce Feinberg & Terry Williams,
“McDonald=s Corporate Social Responsibility, Animal Welfare Update: North America,” at
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corporate/social/marketplace/welfare/update/northamerica/index.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003). The principal expert advisor to McDonald=s states: “Healthy animals,
properly handled, keep the meat industry running safely, efficiently and profitably.” Temple
Grandin, Recommended Animal Handling Guidelines for Meat Packers 1 (1991).
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Taking Animal Interests Seriously: The Principle of Equal Consideration
We claim to accept that animals are not merely things. We may use animals when
there is a conflict between human and animal interests that requires us to make a
choice, but we have a moral obligation that we owe directly to animals not to
inflict unnecessary suffering on them. Despite what we say, most of our animal
use cannot be described as involving any conflict of interests, and we inflict
extreme pain and suffering on animals in the process. Even if we treated animals
better, that would still leave open the question of our moral justification for
imposing any suffering at all if animal use is not necessary. We may, of course,
decide to discard the humane treatment principle and acknowledge that we regard
animals as nothing more than things without any morally significant interests.
This option would at least spare us the need for thinking about our moral
obligations to animals. We would not have any.
Alternatively, if we are to make good on our claim to take animal interests
seriously, then we can do so in only one way: by applying the principle of equal
considerationCthe rule that we ought to treat like cases alike unless there is a
good reason not to do soCto animals.58 The principle of equal consideration is a
necessary component of every moral theory. Any theory that maintains that it is
permissible to treat similar cases in a dissimilar way would fail to qualify as an
acceptable moral theory for that reason alone. Although there may be many
differences between humans and animals, there is at least one important similarity
that we all already recognize: our shared capacity to suffer. In this sense, humans
and animals are similar to each other and different from everything else in the
universe that is not sentient. If our supposed prohibition on the infliction of
unnecessary suffering on animals is to have any meaning at all, then we must give
equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering.
The suggestion that animal interests should receive equal consideration is
not as radical as it may appear at first if we consider that the humane treatment

58. See Francione, supra note 6, at 81B102. A reason not to treat similar cases in a similar
way must not be arbitrary and thereby itself violate the principle of equal consideration.
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principle incorporates the principle of equal consideration. We are to weigh our
suffering in not using animals against animal interests in avoiding suffering. If
there is a conflict between human and animal interests and the human interest
weighs more, then the animal suffering is justifiable. If there is no conflict, or if
there is a conflict of interests but the animal interest weighs more, then we are not
justified in using the animal. And if there is a conflict of interests but the interests
at stake are similar, then we should presumably treat those interests in the same
way and impose suffering on neither or both unless there is some nonarbitrary
reason that justifies differential treatment. Moreover, the humane treatment
principle as it developed historically explicitly included the principle of equal
consideration. Bentham recognized that the only way to ensure that animal
interests in not suffering were taken seriously was to apply the principle of equal
consideration to animals, and Bentham=s position therefore “incorporated the
essential basis of moral equality . . . by means of the formula: ‘Each to count for
one and none for more than one.’”59 Animal suffering cannot be discounted or
ignored based on the supposed lack of some characteristic other than sentience if
animals are not to be “degraded into the class of things.” But Bentham never
questioned the property status of animals because he mistakenly believed that the
principle of equal consideration could be applied to animals even if they are
property.60 Bentham=s error was perpetuated through laws that purported to
balance the interest of property owners and their property.
The problem is that, as we have seen, there can be no meaningful
balancing of interests if animals are property. The property status of animals is a
two-edged sword wielded against their interests. First, it acts as blinders that
effectively block even our perception of their interests as similar to ours because
human “suffering” is understood as any detriment to property owners. Second, in
those instances in which human and animal interests are recognized as similar,
animal interests will fail in the balancing because the property status of animals is
59. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 5 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting Bentham).
60. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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always a good reason not to accord similar treatment unless to do so would
benefit property owners. Animal interests will almost always count for less than
one; animals remain as they were before the nineteenth centuryCthings without
morally significant interests.
The application of the principle of equal consideration similarly failed in
the context of North American slavery, which allowed some humans to treat
others as property.61 The institution of human slavery was structurally identical to
the institution of animal ownership. Because a human slave was regarded as
property, the slave owner was able to disregard all of the slave=s interests if it was
economically beneficial to do so, and the law generally deferred to the slave
owner=s judgment as to the value of the slave. As chattel property, slaves could be
sold, willed, insured, mortgaged, and seized in payment of the owner=s debts.
Slave owners could inflict severe punishments on slaves for virtually any reason.
Those who intentionally or negligently injured another=s slave were liable to the
owner in an action for damage to property. Slaves could not enter into contracts,
own property, sue or be sued, or live as free persons with basic rights and duties.
It was generally acknowledged that slaves had an interest in not suffering:
Slaves “are not rational beings. No, but they are the creatures of God, sentient
beings, capable of suffering and enjoyment, and entitled to enjoy according to the
measure of their capacities. Does not the voice of nature inform everyone, that he
is guilty of wrong when he inflicts on them pain without necessity or object?”62
Although there were laws that ostensibly regulated the use and treatment of
slaves, they failed completely to protect slave interests. The law often contained
exceptions that eviscerated any protection for the slaves. For example, North
Carolina law provided that the punishment for the murder of a slave should be the
61. The principle of equal consideration also failed in other systems of slavery, but
because of differences among these systems, I confine my description to North American slavery.
For a discussion of various systems of slavery and slave law, see Alan Watson, Slave Law in the
Americas (1989); Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law (1989); Alan Watson, “Roman Slave Law and
Romanist Ideology,” 37 Phoenix 53 (1983).
62. Chancellor Harper, “Slavery in the Light of Social Ethics,” in Cotton Is King, and
Pro-Slavery Arguments 549, 559 (E.N. Elliott ed., 1860).
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same as for the murder of a free person, but this law “did not apply to an outlawed
slave, nor to a slave ‘in the act of resistance to his lawful owner,’ nor to a slave
‘dying under moderate correction.’”63 A law that prohibits the murder of slaves
but permits three general and easily satisfied exceptions, combined with a general
prohibition against the testimony of slaves against free persons, cannot effectively
deter the murder of slaves. That the law refused to protect the interests of slaves
against slave owners is underscored in State v. Mann, in which the court held that
even the “cruel and unreasonable battery” of one=s own slave is not indictable:
Courts cannot “allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the
courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is
no appeal from his master.”64 To the extent that the law regulated the conduct of
slave owners, it had nothing to do with concern for the interests of the slaves. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Turner, the court determined that it had no
jurisdiction to try the defendant slave owner, who beat his slave with “rods, whips
and sticks,” and held that even if the beating was administered “wilfully and
maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately, and excessively,” the court was not
empowered to act as long as the slave did not die.65 The court distinguished
private beatings from public chastisement; the latter might subject the master to
liability “not because it was a slave who was beaten, nor because the act was
unprovoked or cruel; but, because ipso facto it disturbed the harmony of society;
was offensive to public decency, and directly tended to a breach of the peace. The
same would be the law, if a horse had been so beaten.”66
Slave welfare laws failed for precisely the same reason that animal welfare
laws fail to establish any meaningful limit on our use of animal property. The
63. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, “Institutions and the Law of Slavery: Slavery in
Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Cultures,” in The Law of American Slavery 111, 115 (Kermit L. Hall
ed., 1987) (quoting William Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice 180
(1853)). For a discussion of slave law in the context of animal welfare law, see Francione, supra
note 6, at 86B90; Francione, supra note 10, at 100B12.
64. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 267 (1829).
65. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 678 (1827).
66. Id. at 680.
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owner=s property interest in the slave always trumped any interest of the slave
who was ostensibly protected under the law. The interests of slaves were observed
only when it provided an economic benefit for the owners or served their whim.
Alan Watson has noted that “[a]t most places at most times a reasonably
economic owner would be conscious of the chattel value of slaves and thus would
ensure some care in their treatment.”67 Any legal limitations on the cruelty of
slave owners reflected the concern that they should not use their property in
unproductive ways; as expressed by the Roman jurist Justinian, “‘it is to the
advantage of the state that no one use his property badly.’”68 Although some slave
owners were more “humane” than others and some even treated slaves as family
members, any kind treatment was a matter of the master=s charity and not of the
slave=s right, and slavery as a legal institution had the inevitable effect of treating
humans as nothing more than commodities. The principle of equal consideration
had no meaningful application to the interests of a human whose only value was
as a resource belonging to others. Slaves were rarely considered to have any
interests similar to slave owners or other free persons; in those instances in which
interests were recognized as similar, the property status of the slave was always a
good reason not to accord similar treatment unless to do so would benefit the
owner.
We eventually recognized that if humans were to have any morally
significant interests, they could not be the resources of others and that race was
not a sufficient reason to treat certain humans as property.69 Although we tolerate
varying degrees of exploitation, and we may disagree about what constitutes equal
treatment, we no longer regard it as legitimate to treat any humans, irrespective of

67. Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, supra note 61, at xiv.
68. Id. at 31 (quoting Justinian).
69. Even after the abolition of slavery, race continued to serve as a reason to justify
differential treatment, often on the ground that whites and people of color did not have similar
interests and, therefore, did not have to be treated equally in certain respects, and often on the
ground that race was a reason to deny similar treatment to admittedly similar interests. But
abolition recognized that, irrespective of race, all humans had a similar interest in not being treated
as the property of others.
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their particular characteristics, as the property of others. Indeed, in a world deeply
divided on many moral issues, one of the few norms steadfastly endorsed by the
international community is the prohibition of human slavery. It matters not
whether the particular form of slavery is “humane” or not; we condemn all human
slavery. More brutal forms of slavery are worse than less brutal forms, but we
prohibit human slavery in general because all forms of slavery more or less allow
the interests of slaves to be ignored if it provides a benefit to slave owners, and
humans have an interest in not suffering the deprivation of their fundamental
interests merely because it benefits someone else, however “humanely” they are
treated. It would, of course, be incorrect to say that human slavery has been
eliminated from the planet. But the peremptory norms in international lawCthose
few, select rules regarded as of such significance that they admit of no derogation
by any nationCinclude the prohibition of slavery, which humanity deems so
odious that no civilized nation can bear its existence.
The interest of a human in not being the property of others is protected by
a right. When an interest is protected by a right, the interest may not be ignored or
violated simply because it will benefit others. Rights are “moral notions that grow
out of respect for the individual. They build protective fences around the
individual. They establish areas where the individual is entitled to be protected
against the state and the majority even where a price is paid by the general
welfare.”70 If we are going to recognize and protect the interest of humans in not
being treated as property, then we must use a right to do so; if we do not, then
those humans who do not have this protection will be treated merely as
commodities whenever it will benefit others. Therefore, the interest in not being
treated as property must be protected against being traded away even if a price is
paid by the general welfare.

70. Bernard E. Rollin, “The Legal and Moral Bases of Animal Rights,” in Ethics and
Animals 103, 106 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds., 1983). See Francione, supra note
6, at xxviBxxx. For a general discussion of the concept of rights and rights theory in the context of
laws concerning animals, see Francione, supra note 10, at 91B114.
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The right not to be treated as the property of others is basic and different
from any other rights we might have because it is the grounding for those other
rights; it is a prelegal right that serves as the precondition for the possession of
morally significant interests. The basic right is the right to the equal consideration
of one=s fundamental interests; it recognizes that if some humans have value only
as resources, then the principle of equal consideration will have no meaningful
application to their interests. Therefore, the basic right must be understood as
prohibiting human slavery, or any other institutional arrangement that treats
humans exclusively as means to the ends of others and not as ends in
themselves.71
The protection afforded by the basic right not to treated as property is
limited. The basic right does not guarantee equal treatment in all respects nor
protect humans from all suffering, but it protects all humans, irrespective of their
particular characteristics, from suffering any deprivation of interests as the result
of being used exclusively as the resources of others and thereby provides essential
protections. We may not enslave humans nor, for that matter, may we exert total
control over their bodies by using them as we do laboratory animals, or as forced
organ donors, or as raw materials for shoes, or as objects to be hunted for sport or
torturedCirrespective of whether we claim to treat them “humanely” in the

71. Similar concepts have been recognized by philosophers and political theorists. Kant,
for example, maintained that there is one “innate” rightCthe right of “innate equality,” or the
“independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a
human being=s quality of being his own master.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ''
6:237B38, at 30 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). This innate right
“grounds our right to have rights.” Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant=s Moral Theory 248 (1989).
The basic right not to be treated as property is different from what are referred to as natural rights
insofar as these are understood to be rights that exist apart from their recognition by any particular
legal system because they are granted by God. For example, John Locke regarded property rights
as natural rights that were grounded in God=s grant to humans of dominion over the earth and
animals. The basic right not to be treated as property expresses a proposition of logic. If human
interests are to have moral significance (i.e., if human interests are to be treated in accordance with
the principle of equal consideration), then humans cannot be the property of other humans. For a
further discussion of this basic right and the related concept of inherent value, see Francione,
supra note 6, at 92B100. See also Henry Shue, Basic Rights (2d ed. 1996).
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process.72 An employer may treat her employees instrumentally and disregard
their interest in a midmorning coffee break, or even their interest in health care, in
the name of profit. But there are limits. She cannot force her employees to work
without compensation. Pharmaceutical companies cannot test new drugs on
employees who have not consented. Food-processing plants cannot make hot dogs
or luncheon meats out of workers. To possess the basic right not to be treated as
property is a minimal prerequisite to being a moral and legal person; it does not
specify what other rights the person may have. Indeed, the rejection of slavery is
required by any moral theory that purports to accord moral significance to the
interests of all humans even if the particular theory otherwise rejects rights.73
Animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering, but, as we have
seen, the principle of equal consideration has no meaningful application to animal
interests if they are the property of others just as it had no meaningful application
to the interests of slaves. The interests of animals as property will almost always
count for less than do the interests of their owners. Some owners may choose to
treat their animals well, or even as members of their families as some do with
their pets, but the law will generally not protect animals against their owners.
Animal ownership as a legal institution inevitably has the effect of treating
animals as commodities. Moreover, animals, like humans, have an interest in not
suffering at all from the ways in which we use them, however “humane” that use
may be. To the extent that we protect humans from being used in these ways and
we do not extend the same protection to animals, we fail to accord equal
consideration to animal interests in not suffering.

72. Human experimentation is prohibited by the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki
Declaration. Torture is prohibited by the International Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The notable exception to the protection
provided by the basic right is compulsory military service, which is controversial precisely
because it does treat humans exclusively as means to the ends of others in ways that other acts
required by the government, such as the payment of taxes, do not.
73. See Francione, supra note 6, at 94, 131B33. See also supra note 71; infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
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If we are going to take animal interests seriously, we must extend to
animals the one right that we extend to all humans irrespective of their particular
characteristics. To do so would not mean that animals would be protected from all
suffering. Animals in the wild may be injured, or become diseased, or may be
attacked by other animals. But it would mean that animals could no longer be
used as the resources of humans and would, therefore, be protected from suffering
at all from such uses. Is there a morally sound reason not to extend to animals the
right not to be treated as property, and thereby recognize that our obligation not to
impose unnecessary suffering on them is really an obligation not to treat them as
property? Or, to ask the question in another way, why do we deem it acceptable to
eat animals, hunt them, confine and display them in circuses and zoos, use them
in experiments or rodeos, or otherwise to treat them in ways in which we would
never think it appropriate to treat any human irrespective of how “humanely” we
were to do so?
The usual response claims that some empirical difference between humans
and animals constitutes a good reason for not according to animals the one right
we accord to all humans. According to this view, there is some qualitative
distinction between humans and animals (all species considered as a single group)
that purportedly justifies our treating animals as our property. This distinction
almost always concerns some difference between human and animal minds; we
have some mental characteristic that animals lack, or are capable of certain
actions of which animals are incapable as a result of our purportedly superior
cognitive abilities. The list of characteristics that are posited as possessed only by
humans includes self-consciousness, reason, abstract thought, emotion, the ability
to communicate, and the capacity for moral action.74 We claimed to reject the
74. Some claim that the relevant difference between humans and nonhumans is that the
former possess souls and the latter do not. For a discussion of this and other purported differences,
see Francione, supra note 6, at 103B29. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. I do not
mean to suggest that everyone after 1800 who has relied on these differences to justify our
treatment of animals as resources acknowledges that animals have any morally significant
interests; indeed, some accept and defend the status of animals as things morally indistinguishable
from inanimate objects. See, e.g., Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice
(1992).
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relevance of these characteristics 200 years ago when we supposedly embraced
the idea that the capacity to suffer was the only attribute needed to ground our
moral obligation to animals not to impose unnecessary suffering on them. Yet, the
absence of these same characteristics continues to serve as our justification for
treating animals as our resources and has been used to keep animals “degraded
into the class of things” despite our claim to take animal interests seriously.
The problem started with Bentham himself.75 Although Bentham=s
analysis of slavery is not entirely clear, he opposed human slavery at least in part
because the principle of equal consideration would not apply to humans who are
slaves. He acknowledged that a particular slave owner might treat a slave well and
that some forms of slavery were better than others, but “slavery once established,
was always likely to be the lot of large numbers. ‘If the evil of slavery were not
great its extent alone would make it considerable.’”76 Slavery as an institution
would inevitably result in humans being treated as things and “abandoned without
redress to the caprice of a tormentor.”77 Slaves would necessarily count for less
than did those who were not slaves. Bentham regarded the concept of moral rights
as nonsense, but he did, in effect, recognize that humans had a right not to be
treated as property.78 He noted that just as the color of skin was an insufficient
reason to abandon humans to the caprice of a tormentor, “the number of the legs,
the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally
75. For a discussion of the views of Bentham and his modern proponent, Peter Singer, see
Francione, supra 6, at 130B50.
76. H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 97 (1982) (quoting Bentham).
77. Bentham, supra note 12, at 282B83 n.b. (further note omitted).
78. I recognize that most Bentham scholars regard Bentham=s objections to slavery to be
based exclusively on the consequences of slavery and claim that Bentham did not think that
slavery violated any moral right. It appears, however, that Bentham, who is generally regarded as
an act utilitarian, was at the very least a rule utilitarian when it came to slavery; that is, he thought
that the consequences of the institution of slavery were necessarily undesirable and, in effect, he
recognized that the human interest in not being treated as a resource should be accorded rightstype protection. Moreover, Bentham did talk in terms of moral rights when he discussed human
slavery and the treatment of animals, see id., although he was probably referring to the right to
equal consideration in that passage. Bentham may well have recognized on some level that a right
to equal consideration is inconsistent with the status of being a slave. See Francione, supra note 6,
at 132B33.
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insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate.”79 Why, then, did
Bentham not reject the treatment of animals as property as he had rejected the
treatment of humans as property?
The answer is related to Bentham=s view that animals, like humans, have
interests in not suffering but, unlike humans, have no interest in their continued
existence. That is, Bentham believed that animals do not have a sense of self; they
live moment to moment and have no continuous mental existence. Their minds
consist of collections of unconnected sensations of pain and pleasure. On this
view, death is not a harm for animals; animals do not care about whether we eat
them, or use and kill them for other purposes, as long as we do not make them
suffer in the process: “If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why
we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it,
and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted
anticipations of future misery which we have.”80 Although Bentham explicitly
rejected the position that, because animals lack characteristics beyond sentience,
such as self-awareness, we could treat them as things, he maintained that because
animals lack this characteristic, we do not violate the principle of equal
consideration by using animals as our resources as long as we give equal
consideration to their interests in not suffering.
Bentham=s position is problematic for several reasons. Bentham failed to
recognize that although particular animal owners might treat their animal property
kindly, institutionalized animal exploitation would, like slavery, become “the lot
of large numbers,” and animals would necessarily be treated as economic
commodities that were, like slaves, “abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
79. Bentham, supra note 12, at 282B83 n.b.
80. Id. Bentham also claimed that “[t]he death [that animals] suffer in our hands
commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which
would await them in the inevitable course of nature.” Id. Bentham ignored the fact that the
domestic animals that we raise for food would not have a death “in the inevitable course of
nature,” because they are only brought into existence as our resources in the first place. It is,
therefore, problematic to defend the killing of domestic animals by comparing their deaths with
those of wild animals, saying that the infliction of unnecessary pain on domestic animals that we
do not need to eat is less than the pain that may necessarily be suffered by wild animals.
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tormentor.” Moreover, Bentham never explained how to apply the principle of
equal consideration to animals who were the property of humans.81 But most
important, Bentham was simply wrong to claim that animals are not self-aware
and have no interest in their lives.
Sentience is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of staying alive.
Sentient beings use sensations of pain and suffering to escape situations that
threaten their lives and sensations of pleasure to pursue situations that enhance
their lives. Just as humans will often endure excruciating pain in order to remain
alive, animals will often not only endure but inflict on themselves excruciating
painCas when gnawing off a paw caught in a trapCin order to live. Sentience is
what evolution has produced in order to ensure the survival of certain complex
organisms. To claim that a being who has evolved to develop a consciousness of

81. Peter Singer, who, like Bentham, is a utilitarian and eschews moral rights, adopts
Bentham=s position and argues that most animals do not have an interest in their lives, but that the
principle of equal consideration can nevertheless be applied to their interests in not suffering even
if animals are the property of humans. Singer=s argument fails in a number of respects. First,
Singer requires that we make interspecies comparisons of pain and suffering in order to apply the
principle of equal consideration to animal interests. See Singer, supra note 59, at 15. Such
comparisons are inherently difficult (if not impossible) to make. Second, because most humans are
self-aware and most animals are not (in Singer=s view), it is difficult to understand how animals
and humans will ever be considered as similarly situated for purposes of equal consideration.
Singer recognizes that because we are unlikely to regard human and animal interests as similar in
the first place, we are also unlikely to find any guidance in the principle of equal consideration. Id.
at 16. That is, however, tantamount to admitting that animal interests are not morally significant
because the principle of equal consideration will never have any meaningful application to animal
interests. Singer avoids this conclusion by claiming that even if the principle of equal
consideration is inapplicable, it is still clear that much animal suffering is not morally justifiable.
He states, for example, that we need not apply the principle of equal consideration in order to
conclude that the positive consequences for animals of abolishing intensive agriculture would be
greater than any detrimental consequences for humans. It remains unclear how Singer can arrive at
this conclusion other than through mere stipulation. The abolition of intensive agriculture would
have a profound impact on the international economy and would cause an enormous rise in the
price of meat and animal products. If the issue hinges only on consequences, it is not at all clear
that the consequences for self-aware humans would not be weightier than the consequences for
non-self-aware animals. Fourth, even if Singer=s theory would lead to more “humane” animal
treatment, it would still permit us to use animals as resources in ways that we do not use any
humans. Singer=s response to this would be that he would be willing to use similarly situated
humans, such as the mentally or physically disabled, as replaceable resources. Id.; see also Peter
Singer, Practical Ethics 186 (2d ed. 1993). For the reasons discussed below, most of us would
reject Singer=s views on the use of vulnerable humans. See infra notes 95B97 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Singer=s views, see Francione, supra note 6, at 135B48; Francione, Rain
Without Thunder, supra note 56, at 156B60, 173B76.
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pain and pleasure has no interest in remaining alive is to say that conscious beings
have no interest in remaining conscious, a most peculiar position to take.
Moreover, the proposition that humans have mental characteristics wholly
absent in animals is inconsistent with the theory of evolution. Darwin maintained
that there are no uniquely human characteristics: “[T]he difference in mind
between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and
not of kind.”82 Animals are able to think, and possess many of the same emotional
responses as do humans: “[T]he senses and intuitions, the various emotions and
faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of
which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a welldeveloped condition, in the lower animals.”83 Darwin noted that “associated
animals have a feeling of love for each other” and that animals “certainly
sympathise with each other=s distress or danger.”84
Even if we cannot know the precise nature of animal self-awareness, it
appears that any being that is aware on a perceptual level must be self-aware and
have a continuous mental existence. Biologist Donald Griffin has observed that if
animals are conscious of anything, “the animal=s own body and its own actions
must fall within the scope of its perceptual consciousness.”85 Yet we deny animals
self-awareness because we maintain that they cannot “think such thoughts as ‘It is
I who am running, or climbing this tree, or chasing that moth.’”86 Griffin
maintains that “when an animal consciously perceives the running, climbing, or
moth-chasing of another animal, it must also be aware of who is doing these
things. And if the animal is perceptually conscious of its own body, it is difficult
to rule out similar recognition that it, itself, is doing the running, climbing, or

82. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 105 (Princeton Univ. Press 1981). See James
Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990).
83. Darwin, supra note 82, at 105.
84. Id. at 76, 77.
85. Donald R. Griffin, Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness 274 (2001).
86. Id.
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chasing.”87 Griffin concludes that “[i]f animals are capable of perceptual
awareness, denying them some level of self-awareness would seem to be an
arbitrary and unjustified restriction.”88 Griffin=s reasoning can be applied in the
context of sentience. Any sentient being must have some level of self-awareness.
To be sentient means to be the sort of being who recognizes that it is that being,
and not some other, who is experiencing pain or distress. When a dog experiences
pain, the dog necessarily has a mental experience that tells her “this pain is
happening to me.” In order for pain to exist, some consciousnessCsomeoneCmust
perceive it as happening to her and must prefer not to experience it.
Antonio Damasio, a neurologist who works with humans who have
suffered strokes, seizures, and conditions that cause brain damage, maintains that
such humans have what he calls “core consciousness.” Core consciousness, which
does not depend on memory, language, or reasoning, “provides the organism with
a sense of self about one momentCnowCand about one placeChere.”89 Humans
who experience transient global amnesia, for example, have no sense of the past
or the future but do have a sense of self with respect to present events and objects,
and such humans would most certainly regard death as a harm. Damasio
maintains that many animal species possess core consciousness. He distinguishes
core consciousness from what he calls “extended consciousness,” which requires
reasoning and memory, but not language, and involves enriching one=s sense of
self with autobiographical details and what we might consider a representational
sense of consciousness. Extended consciousness, of which there are “many levels
and grades,” involves a self with memories of the past, anticipations of the future,
and awareness of the present.90 Although Damasio argues that extended
consciousness reaches its most complex level in humans, who have language and

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Antonio R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the
Making of Consciousness 16 (1999).
90. Id.
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sophisticated reasoning abilities, he maintains that chimpanzees, bonobos,
baboons, and even dogs may have an autobiographical sense of self.91 Even if
most animals do not have extended consciousness, most of the animals we
routinely exploit undoubtedly have at least core consciousness, which means that
they are self-conscious. In short, the fact that animals may not have an
autobiographical sense of their lives (or one that they can communicate to us)
does not mean that they do not have a continuous mental existence, or that they do
not have an interest in their lives, or that killing them makes no difference to
them.
Cognitive ethologists and others have confirmed that animals, including
mammals, birds, and even fish, have many of the cognitive characteristics once
thought to be uniquely human.92 Animals possess considerable intelligence and
are able to process information in sophisticated and complex ways. They are able
to communicate with other members of their own species as well as with humans;
indeed, there is considerable evidence that nonhuman great apes can communicate
using symbolic language. The similarities between humans and animals are not
limited to cognitive or emotional attributes alone. Some argue that animals exhibit
what is clearly moral behavior as well. For example, Frans de Waal states that
“honesty, guilt, and the weighing of ethical dilemmas are traceable to specific
areas of the brain. It should not surprise us, therefore, to find animal parallels. The
human brain is a product of evolution. Despite its larger volume and greater
complexity, it is fundamentally similar to the central nervous system of other
mammals.”93 There are numerous instances in which animals act in altruistic ways
toward unrelated members of their own species and toward other species,
including humans.
91. See id. at 198, 201.
92. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 85; Marc D. Hauser, The Evolution of Communication
(1996); Marc D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (2000); Readings in Animal
Cognition (Marc Bekoff & Dale Jamieson eds., 1996); Sue Savage-Rumbaugh & Roger Lewin,
Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind (1994).
93. Frans de Waal, Good-Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and
Other Animals 218 (1996).
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Although it is clear that animals other than humans possess characteristics
purported to be unique to humans, it is also clear that there are differences
between humans and other animals. For example, even if animals are self-aware
on some level, that does not mean that animals can recognize themselves in
mirrors (although some nonhuman primates do) or keep diaries or anticipate the
future by looking at clocks and calendars; even if animals have the ability to
reason or think abstractly, that does not mean that they can do calculus or
compose symphonies. Yet for at least two related reasons, the humanlike varieties
of these characteristics cannot serve to provide a morally sound, nonarbitrary
basis for denying the right not to be treated as property to animals who may lack
these characteristics.94
First, any attempt to justify treating animals as resources based on their
lack of supposed uniquely human characteristics begs the question from the outset
by assuming that certain human characteristics are special and justify differential
treatment. Even if, for instance, no animals other than humans can recognize
themselves in mirrors or can communicate through symbolic language, no human
is capable of flying, or breathing underwater, without assistance. What makes the

94. There are problems in relying on similarities between humans and animals beyond
sentience to justify the moral significance of animals. See Francione, supra note 6, at 116B19. For
example, a focus on similarities beyond sentience threatens to create new hierarchies in which we
move some animals, such as the great apes or dolphins, into a preferred group, and continue to
treat other animals as our resources. There has for some years been an international effort to
secure certain rights for the nonhuman great apes. This project was started by the publication of a
book entitled The Great Ape Project (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993), which seeks “the
extension of the community of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees,
gorillas, and orangutans.” Id. at 4. I was a contributor to The Great Ape Project. See Gary L.
Francione, APersonhood, Property, and Legal Competence,” in id. at 248B57. The danger of The
Great Ape Project is that it reinforces the notion that characteristics beyond sentience are
necessary and not merely sufficient for equal treatment. In my essay in The Great Ape Project, I
tried to avoid this problem by arguing that although the considerable cognitive and other
similarities between the human and nonhuman great apes are sufficient to accord the latter equal
protection under the law, these similarities are not necessary for animals to have a right not to be
treated as resources. See id. at 253. See also Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, “From Property to
Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart,” 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1 (2000). For an approach that argues
that characteristics beyond sentience are necessary and not merely sufficient for preferred animals
to have a right not to be treated as resources in at least some respects, see Steven M. Wise,
Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (2002), and Steven M. Wise, Rattling
the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (2000).
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ability to recognize oneself in a mirror or use symbolic language better in a moral
sense than the ability to fly or breathe underwater? The answer, of course, is that
we say so. But apart from our proclamation, there is simply no reason to conclude
that characteristics thought to be uniquely human have any value that allows us to
use them as a nonarbitrary justification for treating animals as property. These
characteristics can serve this role only after we have assumed their moral
relevance.
Second, even if all animals other than humans lack a particular
characteristic beyond sentience, or possess it to a different degree than do
humans, there is no logically defensible relationship between the lack or lesser
degree of that characteristic and our treatment of animals as resources.
Differences between humans and other animals may be relevant for other
purposesCno sensible person argues that we ought to enable nonhuman animals to
drive cars or vote or attend universitiesCbut the differences have no bearing on
whether animals should have the status of property. We recognize this inescapable
conclusion where humans are involved. Whatever characteristic we identify as
uniquely human will be seen to a lesser degree in some humans and not at all in
others.95 Some humans will have the exact same deficiency that we attribute to
animals, and although the deficiency may be relevant for some purposes, most of
us would reject enslaving such humans, or otherwise treating such humans
exclusively as means to the ends of others.
Consider, for instance, self-consciousness. Peter Carruthers defines selfconsciousness as the ability to have a “conscious experience . . . whose existence
and content are available to be consciously thought about (that is, available for
description in acts of thinking that are themselves made available to further acts
95. Some argue that although certain humans may lack a particular characteristic, the fact
that all humans have the potential to possess the characteristic means that a human who actually
lacks it is for purposes of equal consideration distinguishable from an animal who may also lack it.
See, e.g., Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” 315 New Eng.
J. Med. 865 (1986). This argument begs the question because it assumes that some humans have a
characteristic that they lack and thereby ignores the factual similarity between animals and
humans who lack the characteristic. Moreover, in some instances, animals may possess the
characteristic to a greater degree than do some humans.
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of thinking).”96 According to Carruthers, humans must have what Damasio refers
to as the most complex level of extended consciousness, or a language-enriched
autobiographical sense of self, in order to be self-conscious. But many humans,
such as the severely mentally disabled, do not have self-consciousness in that
sense; we do not, however, regard it as permissible to use them as we do
laboratory animals, or to enslave them to labor for those without their particular
disability. Nor should we. We recognize that a mentally disabled human has an
interest in her life and in not being treated exclusively as a means to the ends of
others even if she does not have the same level of self-consciousness that is
possessed by normal adults; in this sense, she is similarly situated to all other
sentient humans, who have an interest in being treated as ends in themselves
irrespective of their particular characteristics. Indeed, to say that a mentally
disabled person is not similarly situated to all others for purposes of being treated
exclusively as a resource is to say that a less intelligent person is not similarly
situated to a more intelligent person for purposes of being used, for instance, as a
forced organ donor. The fact that the mentally disabled human may not have a
particular sort of self-consciousness may serve as a nonarbitrary reason for
treating her differently in some respectsCit may be relevant to whether we make
her the host of a talk show, or give her a job teaching in a university, or allow her
to drive a carCbut it has no relevance to whether we treat her exclusively as a
resource and disregard her fundamental interests, including her interest in not
suffering and in her continued existence, if it benefits us to do so.
The same analysis applies to every human characteristic beyond sentience
that is offered to justify treating animals as resources. There will be some humans
who also lack this characteristic, or possess it to a lesser degree than do normal
humans. This “defect” may be relevant for some purposes, but not for whether we
treat humans exclusively as resources. We do not treat as things those humans

96. Carruthers, supra note 74, at 181. Peter Singer also requires this sort of selfconsciousness before animals or humans can be considered to have an interest in their lives. See
Singer, supra note 59, at 228B29. See also supra note 81.
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who lack characteristics beyond sentience simply out of some sense of charity.
We realize that to do so would violate the principle of equal consideration by
using an arbitrary reason to deny similar treatment to similar interests in not being
treated exclusively as a means to the ends of others.97 “[T]he question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can theytalk ? but, Can they suffer?”
In sum, there is no characteristic that serves to distinguish humans from all
other animals for purposes of denying to animals the one right that we extend to
all humans. Whatever attribute we may think makes all humans special and
thereby deserving of the right not to be the property of others is shared by
nonhumans. More important, even if there are uniquely human characteristics,
some humans will not possess those characteristics, but we would never think of
using such humans as resources. In the end, the only difference between humans
and animals is species, and species is not a justification for treating animals as
property any more than is race a justification for human slavery.
Animals as “Persons”
If we extend the right not to be property to animals, then animals will become
moral persons. To say that a being is a person is merely to say that the being has
morally significant interests, that the principle of equal consideration applies to
that being, that the being is not a thing. In a sense, we already accept that animals
are persons; we claim to reject the view that animals are things and to recognize
that, at the very least, animals have a morally significant interest in not suffering.
Their status as property, however, has prevented their personhood from being
realized.
The same was true of human slavery. Slaves were regarded as chattel
property. Laws that provided for the Ahumane” treatment of slaves did not make
slaves persons because, as we have seen, the principle of equal consideration
97. In this sense, the equality of all humans is predicated on factual similarities shared by
all humans irrespective of their particular characteristics beyond sentience. All humans have an
interest in not being treated exclusively as means to the ends of others. All humans value
themselves even if no one else values them. See Francione, supra note 6, at 128, 135 n.18.
Moreover, justice (not charity) may require that we be especially conscientious about protecting
humans who lack certain characteristics precisely because of their vulnerability.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art21

41
could not apply to slaves. We tried, through slave welfare laws, to have a threetiered system: things, or inanimate property; persons, who were free; and in the
middle, depending on your choice of locution, “quasi-persons” or “things
plus”Cthe slaves. That system could not work. We eventually recognized that if
slaves were going to have morally significant interests, they could not be slaves
any more, for the moral universe is limited to only two kinds of beings: persons
and things. “Quasi-persons” or “things plus” will necessarily risk being treated as
things because the principle of equal consideration cannot apply to them.
Nor can we use animal welfare laws to render animals “quasi-persons” or
“things plus.” They are either persons, beings to whom the principle of equal
consideration applies and who possess morally significant interests in not
suffering, or things, beings to whom the principle of equal consideration does not
apply and whose interests may be ignored if it benefits us. There is no third
choice. We could, of course, treat animals better than we do; there are, however,
powerful economic forces that militate against better treatment in light of the
status of animals as property. But simply according better treatment to animals
would not mean that they were no longer things. It may have been better to beat
slaves three rather than five times a week, but this better treatment would not have
removed slaves from the category of things. The similar interests of slave owners
and slaves were not accorded similar treatment because the former had a right not
to suffer at all from being used exclusively as a resource, and the latter did not
possess such a right. Animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering at all
from the ways in which we use them, however “humane” that use may be. To the
extent that we protect humans from suffering from these uses and we do not
extend the same protection to animals, we fail to accord equal consideration to
animal interests in not suffering.
If animals are persons, that does not mean that they are human persons; it
does not mean that we must treat animals in the same way that we treat humans or
that we must extend to animals any of the legal rights that we reserve to
competent humans. Nor does this mean that animals have any sort of guarantee of
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a life free from suffering, or that we must protect animals from harm from other
animals in the wild or from accidental injury by humans. As I argue below, it does
not necessarily preclude our choosing human interests over animal interests in
situations of genuine conflict. But it does require that we accept that we have a
moral obligation to stop using animals for food, entertainment, or clothing, or any
other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we ultimately
prohibit the ownership of animals. We should, of course, care for those domestic
animals presently in existence, but we should stop producing animals for human
purposes. The abolition of animal slavery is required by any moral theory that
purports to treat animal interests as morally significant, even if the particular
theory otherwise rejects rights, just as the abolition of human slavery is required
by any theory that purports to treat human interests as morally significant.98
False Conflicts
The question of the moral status of animals addresses the matter of how we ought
to treat animals in situations of conflict between human and animal interests. For
the most part, our conflicts with animals are those that we create. We bring
billions of sentient animals into existence for the sole purpose of killing them. We
then seek to understand the nature of our moral obligations to these animals. Yet
by bringing animals into existence for uses that we would never consider
appropriate for any humans, we have already placed nonhuman animals outside
the scope of our moral community altogether. Despite what we say about taking
98. See supra notes 73, 78 and accompanying text; Francione, supra note 6, at 148. The
theory presented in this essay is different in significant respects from that of Tom Regan. See Tom
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983). Regan argues that animals have rights and that animal
exploitation ought to be abolished and not merely regulated, but he limits protection to those
animals who have preference autonomy, and he thereby omits from the class of rights holders
those animals who are sentient but who do not have preference autonomy. The theory discussed in
this essay applies to any sentient being. Regan uses the concept of basic rights and although he
does not discuss the status of animals as property or the basic right not to be property, he
maintains that some animals should be accorded the right not to be treated exclusively as means to
human ends. Moreover, Regan does not acknowledge that this basic right can be derived solely
from applying the principle of equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering, nor that the
right must be part of any theory that purports to accord moral significance to animal interests even
if that theory otherwise rejects rights. For a further discussion of the differences between my
theory and that of Regan, see Francione, supra note 6, at xxxiiBxxxiv, 94 n.25, 127B28 n.61, 148
n.36, 174 n.1.
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animals seriously, we have already decided that the principle of equal
consideration does not apply to animals and that animals are things that have no
morally significant interests.
Because animals are property, we treat every issue concerning their use or
treatment as though it presented a genuine conflict of interests, and invariably we
choose the human interest over the animal interest even when animal suffering
can be justified only by human convenience, amusement, or pleasure. In the
overwhelming number of instances in which we evaluate our moral obligations to
animals, however, there is no true conflict. When we contemplate whether to eat a
hamburger, buy a fur coat, or attend a rodeo, we do not confront any sort of
conflict worthy of serious moral consideration. If we take animal interests
seriously, we must desist from manufacturing such conflicts, which can only be
constructed in the first place by ignoring the principle of equal consideration and
by making an arbitrary decision to use animals in ways in which we rightly
decline to use any human.
Does the use of animals in experiments involve a genuine conflict between
human and animal interests? Even if a need for animals in research exists, the
conflict between humans and animals in this context is no more genuine than a
conflict between humans suffering from a disease and other humans we might use
in experiments to find a cure for that disease. Data gained from experiments with
animals require extrapolation to humans in order to be useful at all, and
extrapolation is an inexact science under the best of circumstances. If we want
data that will be useful in finding cures for human diseases, we would be better
advised to use humans. We do not allow humans to be used as we do laboratory
animals, and we do not think that there is any sort of conflict between those who
are afflicted or who may become afflicted with a disease and those humans whose
use might help find a cure for that disease. We regard all humans as part of the
moral community, and although we may not treat all humans in the same way, we
recognize that membership in the moral community at the very least precludes
such use of humans. Animals have no characteristic that justifies our use of them
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in experiments that is not shared by some group of humans; because we regard
some animals as laboratory tools yet think it inappropriate to treat any humans in
this way, we manufacture a conflict, ignoring the principle of equal consideration
and treating similar cases in a dissimilar way.
There may, of course, be situations in which we are confronted with a true
emergency, such as the burning house that contains an animal and a human,
where we have time to save only one. Such emergency situations require what
are, in the end, decisions that are arbitrary and not amenable to satisfying general
principles of conduct. Yet even if we would always choose to save the human
over the animal in such situations, it does not follow that animals are merely
resources that we may use for our purposes.99 We would draw no such conclusion
when making a choice between two humans. Imagine that two humans are in the
burning house. One is a young child; the other is an old adult, who, barring the
present conflagration, will soon die of natural causes anyway. If we decide to save
the child for the simple reason that she has not yet lived her life, we would not
conclude that it is morally acceptable to enslave old people, or to use them for
target practice. Similarly, assume that a wild animal is just about to attack a
friend. Our choice to kill the animal in order to save the friend=s life does not
mean that it is morally acceptable to kill animals for food, any more than our
moral justification in killing a deranged human about to kill our friend would
serve to justify our using deranged humans as forced organ donors.
In sum, if we take animal interests seriously, we are not obliged to regard
animals as the same as humans for all purposes any more than we regard all
humans as being the same for all purposes; nor do we have to accord to animals
all or most of the rights that we accord to humans. We may still choose the human
over the animal in cases of genuine conflictCwhen it is truly necessary to do
soCbut that does not mean that we are justified in treating animals as resources
99. A common argument made against the animal rights position is that it is acceptable to
treat animals as things because we are justified in choosing humans over animals in situations of
conflict. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, “Animal Rights,” Slate Dialogues, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/110101/entry/110129/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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for human use.100 And if the treatment of animals as resources cannot be justified,
then we should abolish the institutionalized exploitation of animals. We should
care for domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into
existence. The abolition of animal exploitation could not, as a realistic matter, be
imposed legally unless and until a significant portion of us took animal interests
seriously. Our moral compass will not find animals while they are lying on our
plates. In other words, we have to put our vegetables where our mouths are and
start acting on the moral principles that we profess to accept.
If we stopped treating animals as resources, the only remaining humananimal conflicts would involve animals in the wild. Deer may nibble our
ornamental shrubs; rabbits may eat the vegetables we grow. The occasional wild
animal may attack us. In such situations, we should, despite the difficulty inherent
in making interspecies comparisons, try our best to apply the principle of equal
consideration and to treat similar interests in a similar way. This will generally
require at the very least a good-faith effort to avoid the intentional killing of
animals to resolve these conflicts, where lethal means would be prohibited if the
conflicts involved only humans. I am, however, not suggesting that the
recognition that animal interests have moral significance requires that a motorist
who unintentionally strikes an animal be prosecuted for an animal equivalent of
manslaughter. Nor do I suggest that we should recognize a cause of action
allowing a cow to sue the farmer. The interesting question is why we have the
cow here in the first instance.

100. The choice of humans over animals in situations of genuine emergency or conflict
does not necessarily represent speciesism because there are many reasons other than species bias
that can account for the choice. See Francione, supra note 6, at 159B62.
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